European countries introduced a combination of demand-side fiscal policies and mandatory supply-side emissions standards to reduce CO 2 emissions rates of new cars. I quantify the equilibrium response to one of the most drastic demand-side policies, the Finnish CO 2 differentiation of automobile sales tax rates. I find that even this drastic environmental tax reform did not drive the observed decline of new-car CO 2 emissions rates, given the concurrent introduction of mandatory EU CO 2 emissions standards to manufacturers. The CO 2 differentiation of ad valorem tax rates however led to increased local pollution by increasing the market penetration of diesel engines. The Finnish tax differentiation had a positive net welfare effect, as it lowered tax rates on average. It was nonetheless also a very regressive policy leading to large tax revenue losses and a disproportional benefit to high-income consumers. Optimal fiscal policy aiming to balance environmental and public finance goals needs to consider both the market structure as well as other concurrent policies on different levels of government.
Introduction
The policy focus on the reduction of transport-sector greenhouse gas emissions has been growing strongly during the last yen years. The European Union and its member states have introduced a combination of supply and demand-side policies specifically to reduce carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) emissions of new passenger cars. Mandatory EU CO 2 emissions standards for manufacturers became European law in 2009, essentially forcing the industry to produce cleaner cars. 1 Individual member states have implemented various supplementary demand-side fiscal policies, creating a financial incentive for consumers to purchase cleaner cars. Observed CO 2 emissions rates of new cars sold in Europe have declined strongly following the introduction of this policy mix targeting consumers and manufacturers alike.
Academic studies on specific policies generally explain the decline of this key statistic to policymakers generally with the supply-side standards, not with local demand-side fiscal policy. For example, Reynaert (2015) attributes the decline of CO 2 emissions rates in Europe with technological adoption induced by the supply-side standards although his analysis does not control for concurrent changes in local taxes. Gerlagh et al. (2015) use descriptive regressions to show that the increased CO 2 sensitivity of these taxes did little to reduce CO 2 emissions rates. Their simple measure of tax CO 2 sensitivity is however not only driven by tax policy but also by technological adoption due to the supply-side standards. Further research is needed to isolate the effects of specific policies, together with an evaluation of their distributional implications as called for by the OECD (2006) . Furthermore, one of the most drastic policies targeting consumers in multiple European countries has not yet been adequately studied despite its dramatic, heterogeneous market impact with severe distributional effects: the differentiation of automobile ad valorem sales tax rates by vehicle-specific CO 2 emissions rating. I study this environmental tax policy in an institutional setting allowing me to isolate its equilibrium effects on market outcomes from the concurrent introduction of supply-side standards and other policies.
Since 2008, Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands, and other countries have introduced emissionsdifferentiated ad valorem taxes by reforming existing taxes. 2 Linking tax rates to CO 2 emissions ratings, measured in grams per kilometer and determined in a standardized EU test cycle, vehiclespecific tax amounts became increasing functions of both vehicle value and pollution potential. Revenue generation often remains the primary goal of these tax instruments that also aim to affect relative tax-inclusiv consumer prices to guide consumers towards clean, low-emissions car models.
The reform of the Finnish car tax in January 2008 created a range of total tax rates (including both the Finnish car tax and general value-added tax) from 39 percent up to 138 percent. The previous, non-differentiated car tax in comparison had an average total tax rate of around 77 percent. The magnitude and heterogeneity of tax rates underline the need for a detailed evaluation of this tax instrument both from an environmental and public finance perspective.
This study quantifies the equilibrium effects of the Finnish CO 2 tax rate differentiation on the total number and environmental profile of new cars sold, and relates this environmental impact to welfare effects and distributional implications. I estimate a model of supply and demand for new passenger cars from 2004 to 2010 based on the seminal work by Berry et al. (1995, henceforth BLP) . Counterfactual simulations of the estimated model allow the evaluation of the equilibrium effects of taxation. Finland is the ideal market to study this demand-side fiscal policy due to the small size of the market and its institutional stability. The market accounts for only 0.8 percent of the European market for which manufacturers design their vehicles. 3 Local tax policy and market conditions have no effect on product design decisions, allowing me to isolate the market response to local tax policy from changes in vehicle characteristics caused by the concurrent introcution of EU supply-side standards and other demand-side fiscal policies in larger EU member states.
Existing quantitative studies on differentiated ad valorem taxation of passenger cars remain mostly descriptive, such as the Finnish government report by Perrels and Tuovinen (2012) . Mabit (2014) and Van Meerkerk et al. (2014) use discrete-choice demand models to study environmental effects of Danish and Dutch tax-rate differentiation by CO 2 emissions or fuel efficiency. While Giblin and McNabola (2009) also quantify tax revenue changes in their study on the CO 2 differentiation of Irish tax rates, all three studies consider neither consider price endogeneity nor equilibrium price determination. Strategic firm behavior is however crucial to understand the effects of tax policy. Passenger cars are both horizontally and vertically differentiated products, consumers are heterogeneous, and the market is an oligopoly. The effect of taxation critically depends on tax incidence as firms can adjust price-cost markups in response to taxation. Tax incidence and market structure determine the degree to which differentiated tax rates translate into relative consumer price differences intended to guide consumers towards low-emissions cars. I estimate the tax incidence of the Finnish car tax by assuming Nash-Bertrand price competition in differentiated-product oligopoly.
On the demand side, I use a random-coefficients logit model flexible enough to yield reasonable substitution patterns and economic implications. Linear nested logit models, similar to the ones used by Fershtman et al. (1999) and Adamou et al. (2014) to study equilibrium effects of taxation in differentiated-product oligopoly, fail to do so. 4 I am able to estimate the non-linear random coefficients logit model despite the short data period for two reasons. First, the market data I create from the vehicle registration database and database on car tax payments contains sufficient variation caused by both technological adoption and tax-rate differentiation. I also use the dependence of differentiated tax rates on model-specific CO 2 emissions ratings to construct instrumental variables for price endogeneity in addition to the classic "BLP instruments" based on differentiated-product competition. Second, I use individual-level tax-record data to construct micro-moments following Petrin (2002) , also enabling me to quantify the distribution of consumer welfare across income levels.
Market structure and tax incidence are crucial to understand the equilibrium effects of taxation. My results show that the 2008 car tax reform increased total firm profits between 2008 and 2010 by 19.8 percent due to higher sales as well as a higher average price-cost markup. The differentiation of car tax rates by CO 2 emissions implied a reduction of the average tax rate, and firms captured on average around 12 percent of the average reduction of tax rates in form of a higher markup over marginal cost. 5 The average tax reduction was largely passed through to consumers but the pass through is heterogeneous across emissions levels. Firms increased markups relatively the most on car models with the lowest emissions while reducing markups on high-emissions car models. This adjustment of tax-free prices in response to the differentiation of tax rates thus mitigated the intended differentiation of tax-inclusive consumer prices across emissions-levels.
My analysis further shows that domestic fiscal policy did not drive the decline of CO 2 emissions rates of new cars in Finland. Consumers would have predominantly bought cleaner cars regardless of the 2008 car tax reform given the concurrent introduction of mandatory supply-side standards. This ineffectiveness of one of the most drastic supplementary demand-side fiscal policies in Europe therefore confirms the findings of Reynaert (2015) and Gerlagh et al. (2015) . Other studies on specific policies also report a limited effect of demand-side environmental fiscal policy. Huse and Lucinda (2014) find that Swedish consumers would have bought flex-fuel vehicles regardless of a costly tax incentive while D' Haultfoeuille et al. (2014) show that the French CO 2 -based feebate tax system only led to a modest reduction of CO 2 emissions rates.
While the CO 2 differentiation of Finnish car tax rates had little effect on CO 2 emissions rates, it increased the market penetration of diesel. Compared to petrol engines, diesel engines emit all else equal less CO 2 but more nitrogen oxides (NOx) and particulate matter, thus enjoying favorable tax 4 Categorical nesting variables do not adequately capture the relevant dimensions of product differentiation in this application. See Stitzing (2016b) for details, and Grigolon and Verboven (2014) for a more general comparison of nested and random-coefficients logit demand models.
5 Finnish policymakers combined the differentiation of tax rates with a reduction of the average tax rate so that increased sales would help to rejuvenate Finland's aging car fleet. Registration statistics nonetheless show a growing car fleet that continues to age. The tax burden on new cars remains high, and factored into domestic used-car prices, provides no incentive to scrap a functioning car before the end of its lifetime. treatment but also emitting more local pollutants. The increase in local pollution, induced by a tax policy designed to reduce global pollution, was further exxagerated by a strong increase in total sales of new cars of 7.9 percent between 2008 and 2010.
The limited and and questionable environmental benefit of the Finnish 2008 car tax reform is associated with huge distributional implications. The tax policy implied a loss of car tax and VAT revenue of 8.6 percent or 318 million euros (in 2005 euros) between 2008 and 2010, as increased sales of new cars were insufficient to keep tax revenue stable given differentiated but on average lower tax rates. The overwhelming majority of consumers benefited from the tax reform as tax-inclusive equilibrium prices declined on average by 7.3 percent. The aggregate consumer welfare gain exceeds the loss of tax revenue by almost two thirds. A minority of consumers preferring high-emissions car models were however negatively affected. The net welfare effect of the tax reform is nevertheless clearly positive when considering rising firm profits and economic costs of negative environmental effects. 6 The 2008 car tax reform was regressive fiscal policy as high-income consumers benefited disproportionally. On the one hand, high-income consumers benefited from the average reduction of ad valorem tax rates as they are more likely buy a new car and more likely to choose expensive car models. On the other hand, comparison of the post 2008 differentiated car tax to a fixed-rate tax equivalent to the yearly sales-weighted average rate highlights that the CO 2 differentiation is itself regressive in equilibrium. The reduction of the average is nonetheless the the predominant explanation for the magnitude of welfare effects and the large increase both total sales and the market share of diesel engines. A high ad valorem tax on new passenger cars itself has a negative effect on average CO 2 emissions due to the strong correlation of CO 2 emissions and vehicle cost. Nevertheless, the decline of CO 2 emissions rates in Finland is not driven by domestic fiscal policy.
A key implication of this study is the need for optimal fiscal policy to understand the relevant market structure and influence of conurrent, interdependent policies also on different levels of government. The introduction of EU CO 2 emissions standards implies a necessary decline of tax rates of CO 2 differentiated ad valorem tax. In Finland, the change in CO 2 emissions of marketed cars reduced the average tax rate from around 62 percent in 2008 to around 58.5 percent in 2010. Policymakers 6 The inclusion of firm profit changes in a welfare calculation is debatable from a Finnish perspective due to the lack of a domestic industry. My model does not distinguish between foreign manufacturers and domestic importers/ dealers. 5 hence perhaps unsurprisingly raised tax rates in 2012 after a continuous decline of tax revenue.
Institutional Background

The Market
Finland is a Nordic country with around 5.5 million inhabitants and a low population density. No domestic manufacturers exists so all cars are imported. Table (1) compares the Finnish automobile market to its U.S. and German counterparts. Car ownership in Finland relative to population size is high in international comparison, likely due to the low population density. The average Finnish car is nonetheless older than its U.S. and German counterparts, and the Finnish car fleet continues to age, with an average age of 11.6 years in 2014 according to official registration statistics by Trafi (2015) . One explanation for the aging fleet is the high purchase taxation.
The Car Tax
The Finnish car tax (autovero) is levied on passenger cars upon first registration in the country, and is such effectively a sales tax on new cars. 7 It is typically paid directly by the dealer, and is included in published list prices. The car tax is levied in addition to the general value-added tax (VAT). The definition of the car tax as a percentage share of the tax-inclusive retail value complicates tax calculations, see appendix A for details. I express the total tax burden of car tax and VAT as total tax rates on tax-exclusive retail values. The pre-2008 car tax share was fixed at 28 percent. A discount of 650 euros (450 euros for diesel-powered cars) was subtracted, resulting in a sales-weighted total tax rate of 76.9 percent between 2004 and 2007.
The Finnish government differentiated the car tax in January 2008 after short two-month announcement period. Following the differentiation, car tax shares ranges from 10 to 40 percent depending on vehicle-specific CO 2 emissions, from which no discount is subtracted. 8 Figure 1 illustrates the resulting CO 2 differentiation of total tax rates from a minimum of 39.0 percent to a maximum of 138.3 percent. The pivot point of rate equivalence between the CO 2 -differentiated and previous, non-differentiated car tax lies at approximately 225 g/km, equivalent to an average fuel consumption of around 9.4 (8.5) liters per 100 kilometer for petrol (diesel) engines, and almost 30 percent above the CO 2 emissions rate of the average new car sold in the three years prior to the reformThe car tax CO 2 differentiation therefore implied a reduction of the average tax rate as the pivot point of rate equivalence lies almost 30 percent above the average CO 2 emissions of new cars sold in the three 7 Imported used cars from abroad are liable to taxation while cars previously registered in Finland are not taxed again. The car tax is effectively a sales tax on new cars. 8 The CO 2 emissions rating is determined in a standardized European Union test cycle and measured in grams per kilometer.
6 years prior to the reform. 9
Other Automobile Taxes
Finland also levies an annual registration tax (ajoneuvovero). The annual registration tax, which was not reformed during the studied time period, consists of two components: A fixed component levied on all cars, and a second, weight-dependent component only levied on cars with a diesel engine. The government announced a future CO 2 differentiation of the annual registration tax in November 2007 but the annual registration tax was not differentiated before March 2011. 10 With the threat of severe financial penalties, the standards essentially force the industry to achieve a fleet average of 130 grams CO 2 per kilometer by 2015, when the standards became fully binding. Reynaert (2015) discusses the standards in further detail.
Product Cycles
The automobile industry operates with annual product cycles with January as the typical introduction month in Europe according to proprietary industry data analyzed by Klier and Linn (2013) . Vehicle models such as the Volkswagen Golf are sometimes marketed for decades. Physical characteristics of a vehicle model (e.g. design, fuel consumption, weight, etc.) (petrol or diesel) . An example of a product in the dataset is a Volkswagen Golf with a diesel engine. I use sales-weighted averages of technical characteristics and retail value. The retail value is the list price minus a small discount as defined by Tulli which I use as price variable. I exclude models with very few sales from the data as these can be considered market niches. To avoid selection bias from the exclusion of high-emissions cars with low sales following the car tax reform, I only exclude vehicle models with less than six sales per year.
Micro Data
Statistics Finland provided a combination of individual-level population register and tax return data on all adult Finnish residents in the form of FLEED, Finnish linked employee-employer data. I transform the individual-level observations into household-level observations by combining married or cohabitating spouses (if any), and compute the disposable household income (net of taxes and debt) for each household. I use the yearly number of households in FLEED as potential market size to compute market shares. I merge the combined vehicle registration and tax data to the household-level FLEED data to identify household incomes for buyers of new cars. In total, I can link 568, 170 out of the 861, 082 new cars registered between 2004 and 2010 to private households. The other cars are registered to legal entities (including leasing companies and banks) so no income data is available for these registrations.
Other Data Sources
Yearly average fuel costs for petrol and diesel are from Statistics Finland. These average fuel prices are based on the weighted average of fuel prices on the 15th of each month in six Finnish localities.
Comparison to monthly average municipality-level fuel prices from the Finnish fuel price monitoring website tankkaus.com does not indicate economically important regional fuel price variation in Finland. I deflate prices, household incomes, and fuel costs using the Statistics Finland consumer price index to 2005 Euros. Table 2 reports yearly summary statistics. The number of brands (e.g. Volkswagen) is stable over time while the number of marketed models (by make, nameplate and fuel type, see section 3 for details) peaks in 2008. Sales-weighted CO 2 emissions rates are stable until 2007, and decline strongly from 2007 to 2010. The decline of this key statistic to policymakers from 176.1 g/km in 2007 to 148.3 g/km in 2010 equals a 15.8 percent decline in just three years. The negative trend cannot be attributed directly to the 2008 car tax CO 2 differentiation as car models available to consumers simultaneously became cleaner. The negative trend of the average CO 2 emissions ratings of available car models in table 2 is driven by a market-wide trend. Figure 2 highlights the reduction of CO 2 emissions as a market-wide trend by comparing CO 2 densities of of available car model ins 2005 and 2010. Figure 3 further illustrates the decline of CO 2 emissions across market segments. The decline of CO 2 emissions is relatively the strongest in segments with larger, and more powerful cars as illustrated by the segment-specific summary statistics of these years in table 4. Table 3 further illustrates the market-wide decline of CO 2 emissions ratings by CO 2 -specific summary statistics. Whereas already 19.4% of new 2010 passenger cars in Finland met the EU 2015 goal of less than 130 g/km CO 2 , only 0.7% of new registrations in 2005 did so. Average vehicle weight and engine power grew in all CO 2 segments. The decline of CO 2 emissions ratings is thus not driven by downsizing, as emphasized by Reynaert (2015) . A second trend in the market is the growing availability and popularity of diesel models. 11 The market share of diesel-powered car models grows from15.2 percent in 2005 to 40.2 percent in 2010 with a similar trend of their availability. Diesel engines consume ceteris paribus less fuel and emit less CO 2 than petrol engines. A tax system differentiated by CO 2 emissions is therefore preferential for diesel-powered cars. Average vehicle curb weight and engine power grew marginally over time. Total sales of new cars are stable until 2007 before declining strongly, with especially low sales in 2009. The average total tax rate is stable at around 77 percent before the car tax reform in 2008. Following the CO 2 differentiation of car tax rates, the sales-weighted total tax rate declines by around 15 percentage points in 2008. Declining CO 2 emissions rates of new cars implied a further reduction of the average tax rate from 62.1 percent in 2008 to 58.3 percent in 2010.
Summary Statistics
The Econometric Model
I use a static discrete-choice demand following the random-coefficients logit approach by Berry et al. (1995) that I estimate with yearly market-level data and additional micro-moments following Petrin (2002) . I combine the demand model with a differentiated-product Bertrand-Nash pricing game on the supply side.
Demand
The demand model is based on the rational behavior of individual households as consumers. The market for new cars consists of M households as potential consumers. Each household can either buy one of J available models, j = 1, ..., J, or choose to not buy any new car, j = 0. The conditional indirect utility household i derives from buying car j is defined as
where p j is the tax-inclusive consumer price of vehicle model j, X j are non-price product characteristics observed by the econometrician, ξ j is a scalar representing product characteristics unobserved by the econometrician, and ε i,, j is the remaining household-specific valuation of product j with an assumed i.i.d. type I extreme value (Logit or Weibull) distribution.
The random coefficient on price has a distribution varying over income groups. Formally,
where α * is a parameter to be estimated, and y i is a draw from the income distribution which I assume to be log-normal, y i ∼ Ln N(µ t , σ t ). This functional form is similar to the one used by Berry et al. (1999) and Grigolon and Verboven (2014) , and can be derived as a first-order Taylor series approximation to the Cobb-Douglas functional form α log(y i − p j ) used by Berry et al. (1995) . The first-order Taylor approximation avoids the issue of dealing with a log of a potentially negative number while still allowing for an income-dependent marginal utility of income. I estimate the year-specific parameters µ t and σ t from FLEED data on household disposable income (net of taxes and debt). The income parameter α * is allowed to vary across income groups,
whereȳ 1 andȳ 2 divide the population into three equally sized groups ordered by disposable house-hold income.
The random coefficients for the observed non-price product characteristics,β i , follow a normal distribution to capture preference heterogeneity among consumers. Formally, the individual coefficient for characteristic k can be decomposed as β i,k =β k + σ k ν i,k , where ν i,k is a draw from a standard normal distribution. The mean valuationβ k is common to all consumers. The scale parameter σ k can be interpreted as standard deviation around this mean valuation so that
The conditional indirect utility of the outside good (not purchasing a new car) is defined as
and is identified by normalizing the mean utility of the outside good to zero, δ 0 = 0. Identification of the demand model further requires the inclusion of a constant with a random coefficient in the product characteristics vector of the inside goods. The constant can be interpreted as the mean utility households obtain from buying a new passenger car relative to the outside option of not buying any new car.
The parameters to be estimated θ can be split into linear parameters ,θ 1 = β , and non-linear parameters θ 2 = {α * , σ }. The conditional indirect utility (1) can thus be split into a base utility term common to all households,δ j =β X + ξ j , and a household-specific deviation from the base utility,µ i, j = α i p j + Xσ ν + ε i, j . Market demands are obtained by aggregating the choices of all households. Individual choice probabilities of households are given by the classic logit formula, and integration of these choice probabilities over the income distribution and over the distribution of taste shocks yields aggregate market shares,
where P ν is the CDF of unobserved consumer heterogeneity, and P y is the CDF of net household income.
Supply and Equilibrium Price Determination
Firms compete in static Bertrand-Nash fashion: They choose profit-maximizing prices taking attributes of all products, the prices of competing products, and the tax system as given.
Marginal costs are a log-linear function of K observed cost shifters and an unobserved cost component:
where the vector C j represents observed cost characteristics, and ω j is the unobserved cost component. Marginal cost estimates obtain from the demand model and the equilibrium assumption as following. The profit function of firm f is given by
where τ j is the model-specific total tax rate (VAT + car tax), M is the potential market size (number of households), mc j is the marginal cost of product j, s j (·) is the market share equation recovered from the demand side, and C f is the fixed cost for firm f . 12 Firms simultaneously set profit-maximizing prices, yielding J first-order conditions for each product:
The first-order conditions are expressed in matrix form as
where
, if jand rare produced by the same firm 0, otherwise.
This system of equations is solved to recover price-cost markups as a function of prices, non-price product characteristics, and demand parameters,
and solved for marginal costs,
Counterfactual Simulations
I use the first-order conditions (7) to compute the counterfactual equilibrium price vector in various tax policy experiments. Fixed-point iteration quickly finds the equilibrium price vector p c f that solves the system of equations
where τ c f is the vector of counterfactual model-specific tax rates, and mc θ is the vector of marginal costs implied by the set of first order conditions (7) and the demand parameter estimatesθ .
Consumer Welfare
I use compensating variation as measure of consumer welfare change related to a counterfactual tax system. I first take n = 100, 000 draws from the taste and income distributions to compute the compensating variation using simulation. Each draw constitutes a simulated household. For each of these simulated households, I compute the utility-maximizing choice given the equilibrium prices obtaining under the observed tax system. Next, I find the income which generates the same utility level at the equilibrium prices obtaining under a counterfactual tax system. The difference between this income and the household income draw is the household-specific compensating variation. The expected compensating variation for a random household is the average compensating variation over the n simulated households. Multiplying the expected compensating variation by the total number of households in the economy then yields the aggregate consumer welfare change.
Estimation
I estimate the model using GMM via the Petrin (2002) 
BLP Moments
Petrin (2002) describes the Berry et al. (1995) approach as using two different sets of moments. The first set of moments matches the model's predicted market shares (4) to those observed in the data,
Berry (1994) shows that this moment matching is equivalent to solving for the mean utility vector δ (θ 2 ) that matches predicted to observed market shares. The distance between predicted and observed market shares is therefore exactly zero.
The second set of moments relates to the market-level demand and cost disturbances ξ and ω which can be interpreted as unobserved demand and cost characteristics (unobserved to the econometrician). The residuals are assumed to be exogenous to observed demand characteristics X and cost 13 characteristics C. Using a set of instrumental variables Z to overcome endogeneity problems, the exogeneity assumption is exploited to construct the second set of moment conditions,
Instrumental Variables
Instrumental variables are required to both form the BLP moment conditions G 1 , and to account for price endogeneity. While non-price product characteristics are exogenous to the model, price is not. The market-level demand disturbances ξ have the economic interpretation of unobserved product quality. A positive demand disturbance should thus enable the firm to charge a higher price, implying endogeneity of observed prices. Observed non-price product characteristics X are valid instruments for themselves. Optimal instruments for price are functions of observed product characteristics; and I use means of the continuous characteristics as a first-order approximation. 13 Specifically, I use the means of continuous variables in X for products by competing firms, and the means for other products by the same firm. I also use these means within a fuel type segment following Bresnahan et al. (1997) . Huse and Lucinda (2014) points out that the Bresnahan et al.
(1997) instruments implicitly assume a form of localized competition, a reasonable assumption given the highly differentiated nature of the automobile market.
I construct an additional set of demand-set instrumental variables based on the differentiated tax rates levied since 2008. Under the differentiated car tax model-specific average CO 2 emissions directly determine model-specific total tax rates which in turn affect the tax-inclusive consumer price p j . CO 2 emissions therefore act as cost shifters, and functions of own average CO 2 emissions are valid own-price instruments. Since total rates are a convex function of CO 2 emissions, I use average CO 2 emissions and their squared term as additional price instruments for 2008 to 2010 car models.
Micro-Moments
The micro-moments match the average probability of being in a specific income group conditional on purchasing a new car. 14 These moments are given by
where {purchase} is the event that household i purchases a new car, and {y i <ȳ 1 }, {ȳ 1 ≤ y i ≤ȳ 2 }, and {y i >ȳ 2 } are the events of household i being in a specific income group. I take the expectation over the number of observations in FLEED that purchased a new car from 2004 to 2010.
The Objective Function
Both the market-level Berry et al. moments G BLP (θ ) and the micro-moments G micro (θ ) are assumed to uniquely equal zero at the truth θ 0 ,
Numerical optimization then yields the global minimum of the GMM objective function
where W is a weight matrix. Details on the estimation procedure and the optimal weight matrix are provided in the appendix.
Standard Errors
I use two-step GMM with an identity matrix as weight matrix in the first step. The asymptotic variance of the parameter estimates thus reduces to Following Berry et al. (1995) , I aggregate moment restrictions for models with similar make and nameplate into one sample observations. The clustered standard errors of the parameter estimates therefore allow product-specific errors of similar car models to exhibit arbitrary correlation across years and fuel types.
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The demand specification includes vehicle curb weight (in 100 kilograms), the ratio of power (in horse power) and curb weight, and fuel cost (in euros per 100 kilometers) as continuous nonprice product characteristics. I further include brand-level and market-segment fixed effects, as well as an indicator variable for diesel engines. Time fixed-effects account for yearly demand fluctuations. 15 The income-dependent price coefficients add observed consumer heterogeneity to the model. Random coefficients on curb weight, power / weight, and the constant account for unobserved consumer heterogeneity. The cost specification includes log curb weight, log engine power, log fuel consumption (measured in liters per 100 kilometers), a diesel-engine indicator, as well as brand-level, market segment, and time fixed effects. 16 Table 5 reports the parameter estimates of the model and their standard errors. Table 6 shows that these estimates match the micro-moments are precisely due to their large weight resulting from the difference in relative sample sizes (2, 153 model/year observations vs. 568, 170 purchasing households. Price coefficient estimates are negative and precisely estimated for all three income tiers. The fuel-cost coefficient is negative as expected and is statistically significant. 17 The diesel coefficient estimate is negative, reflecting higher annual registration taxes for diesel cars. Fuel cost and tax advantages (under the CO 2 differentiated car tax) can nevertheless render diesel vehicles attractive to consumers. The average consumer valued large and powerful cars but the preference heterogeneity regarding these vehicle characteristics is substantial. Brand-level and market-segment fixed effects, not shown for brevity, follow expected patterns: for example, consumers value German brands over Asian competitors, and derive additional utility from purchasing a luxury vehicle.
Estimated cost-side coefficients are also precisely estimated. Large and powerful cars are more costly to produce while higher fuel consumption has all else equal a negative effect on marginal cost. Diesel engines are more expensive than petrol engines but this parameter is not precisely estimated. Table 7 shows the distribution of estimated sales-weighted own-price elasticities and markups over marginal costs. Negative marginal costs and inelastic demands, problematic in an oligopoly context, do not occur. Table 8 shows a sample of estimated markups and marginal costs of car models in 2010. I discuss marginal cost, price-cost markup, and substitution pattern results in further detail in Stitzing (2016b).
Tax Policy Experiments
I consider two tax policy experiments using counterfactual simulation to study the CO 2 differentiation of car tax rates in 2008. The first counterfactual simulation quantifies the equilibrium effects of this environmentally motivated fiscal policy reform. Comparison of market equilibria obtaining under the differentiated car tax to equilibria obtaining under the non-differentiated car tax reveals those effects. I report these effects both for the 2008-2010 and the 2004-2007 period. The effects of a hypothetical earlier implementation of the tax reform help to understand the dependence of a CO 2 -differentiated tax on the CO 2 -emissions profile of available car models.
The 2008 car tax reform differentiated tax rates by CO 2 emissions but also implied on average lower tax rates. The second counterfactual simulation isolates the equilibrium effects of tax rate differentiation from the reduction of the average tax rate. I compare the 2008-2010 market equilibria observed under the differentiated car tax to the counterfactual equilibria obtaining under fixed-rate car tax regime equal to the yearly sales-weighted tax rates reported in table 2. Market-level averages, while informative, hide the substantial variation of equilibrium effects across car models. Table 10 reports sales-weighted mean effects by emissions segment. Consumer price and tax changes are proportional, and firm markup adjustment is inversely related to model-specific CO 2 emissions and tax rate change. Cars with the lowest CO 2 emissions had the strongest markup increases, while markups on car models with the highest CO 2 emissions declined. Equilibrium price setting therefore dampens the intended relative consumer price differentiation across CO 2 emissions. Table 11 further reports sales-weighted mean effects by market segment. Sales of luxury and sports cars declined due to the car tax reform while especially sales of smaller car models grew. The degree of tax pass-through to consumer prices is also less pronounced in smaller car segments. Firms absorbed for example one fifth of the average tax reduction on mini and small cars. If the car tax would have already been differentiated in the 2004-2007 period, also sales of SUVs would have declined in this period.
Effects of the Finnish 2008 Car Tax Reform
The 2010 car models with the largest absolute consumer price changes due to the differentiation of tax rates are the Lexus RX450h and Porsche Panamera. The equilibrium price of the Lexus hybrid SUV (CO 2 = 148 g/km) declined by 12, 109 euros while the price of the Porsche luxury sedan (CO 2 = 248 g/km) increased by 3, 877 euros. In 2005, the consumer price of a Toyota Prius, a petrol car with expensive hybrid technology (CO 2 = 104 g/km), would have declined the most by 6, 127 euros. The consumer price of a 2005 BMW M5, the fastest production sedan in the world at the time (CO 2 = 357 g/km) , would have increased the most by 39, 163 euros. Figure 5 shows a negative but modest effect of the CO 2 tax-rate differentiation on sales-weighted average CO 2 emissions. The mean change in average CO 2 emissions is −1.9 g/km for the 2008-2010 period, and would have been slightly stronger at −2.9 g/km between 2004 and 2007. These effects are small in magnitude compared to the observed 27.8 g/km decline of this key statistic to policymakers from 2007 to 2010. Consumers would have largely bought cleaner cars regardless of the car tax reform. The trend towards cleaner cars in Finland is thus predominantly driven by exogenous technological change, not by domestic fiscal policy. Furthermore, the effect of the tax-rate differentiation on CO 2 emissions rates becomes weaker over time as marketed cars become cleaner.
Environmental Effects
The effect on total lifetime CO 2 emissions depends on the degree of replacement. Policymakers intended higher sales of new cars so that consumers would replace existing, old cars with new, cleaner cars. While the car tax reform had a positive effect total sales, registration statistics show a growing passenger car fleet. 18 The assumption of no replacement thus appears reasonable. 19 Given the modest reduction of CO 2 emissions rates in relation to the strong increase in sales, total lifetime CO 2 emissions did not shrink but grew slightly with a negligible economic impact. The cost calculations in table 14 are based on the following assumptions: a vehicle lifetime of 15 years, 14, 000 kilometers per year at constant initial average CO 2 emissions, an interest rate of 6 percent, and a social cost of carbon of 15 euros per ton. 20 Figure 4 illustrates another important effect of the CO 2 differentiation of car tax rates: it increases both the total number of new cars sold as well as the market penetration of diesel engines. The top panel shows the effect of a hypothetical earlier reform of the car tax on market outcomes between 2004 and 2007, the bottom panel shows the effect of the 2008 car tax reform on market outcomes between 2008 and 2010. Diesel engines emit all else equal less CO 2 but more nitrogen oxides (NO x ) and particulate matter than comparable petrol engines. Lower CO 2 emissions imply preferential tax treatment under a CO 2 -based tax but higher emissions of the other pollutants create a local pollution problem. These local air pollutants have severe health implications including premature death. 21 Stricter European Union emissions standards and the increasing use diesel particulate filters since the mid-200s have led to a reduction of these harmful emissions of diesel engines but concerns remain, also in regard to the reliability of diesel-engine emissions measurements. I do not have reliable to data to specifically quantify the economic cost of diesel-related externalities. Parry et al. (2007) estimate a general externality cost of 10 U.S. dollar cents per mile per car. I use their estimate to quantify the negative externality of higher sales at no replacement due to increased local pollution, congestion, and accident risk. 22 The cost of these externalities included in table 14 is economically more important than the change in total lifetime CO 2 emissions. Both back-of-the-envelope calculations should be viewed with caution. They nevertheless highlight that environmental implications of the car tax reform are driven by its effect on the extensive margin (the decision to buy a new car) and less by its effect on the intensive margin (what car to buy) of consumer decision-making.
Consumer Welfare
How were consumers affected by the CO 2 -differentiation of car tax rates? Table 12 reports the decomposition of household-level consumer welfare changes in 2010 by purchase status and income group. The table also reports price changes of cars these households would have bought under the non-differentiated car tax. The average price decline of 44 euros for a random household is small because the price change equals zero for the majority of households not buying a new car under either tax system. The relatively large standard deviation of the expected price change of 334 euros reflects the variation in price change across consumers.
The 2008 car tax reform is on average worth 40 euros to 2010 households. Most households would not have bought a new car regardless of the differentiation of tax rates, and are thus unaffected by the tax reform. Households who would have bought a new car under the non-differentiated car tax benefit on average by 1, 633 euros. A minority of households preferring car models becoming more expensive are negatively affected. Decomposition of the expected compensating variation by income tercile reveals the regressive nature of the 2008 car tax reform. The expected welfare gain for a random household in a in the highest income tercile is 71 euros, compared to 10 euros in the lowest income tercile, and 34 euros in the middle one for the middle income tier. High-income households are the biggest beneficiaries also when conditioning on purchase under the non-differentiated car tax. However, some households in the high-income tercile also incur the highest welfare losses due to high price increases of their preferred choices. Consumer welfare gains go nonetheless disproportionally to high-income households for two reasons. First, richer households are more likely to purchase a car than poorer households, and thus benefit more from a tax rate differentiation that lowers tax rates on average. Second, they are more likely to purchase expensive cars. Richer households thus benefit more from an average reduction of tax rates due to the definition of an ad valorem tax as a percentage of price. Table 13 reports the decomposition of household consumer welfare changes in 2005 caused by the hypothetical CO 2 differentiation of tax rates in this year. The change of consumer welfare for a random household is higher in 2005 than in 2010, with similar disproportional welfare gains for richer households. However, the expected welfare change conditional on purchase is slightly lower for the highest income segment compared to the middle one. Car models in 2005 had on average higher CO 2 emissions than in 2010, and high-income buyers of expensive and dirty models such as the BMW M5 incur high welfare losses from the CO 2 differentiation of tax rates. Table 9 reports aggregate welfare effects. Total tax revenue between 2008 and 2010 declines by 9.5 percent. The differentiation of car tax rates in 2008 does not keep tax revenue stable as intended by policymakers. Total firm profits grow both due to higher sales and due to on average higher tax-exclusive prices. I include the change in total firm profits in the calculation of the net welfare change. Finland does not have a car industry of its own, and the econometric model does not distinguish between foreign manufacturers and domestic importers due to a lack of data. The degree to which profit changes should be included in the welfare calculations point remains open from the viewpoint of domestic policymakers. The net welfare effect of the car tax reform for the years 2008 to 2010 is nevertheless positive even when including the cost of negative externalities and when excluding firm profits from the calculation completely.
Aggregate Welfare Effects
The net welfare effect of hypothetical tax-rate differentiation between 2004 and 2007 is likewise positive, even when including the economic cost of externalities. Relative changes of government tax revenue and total firm profits are smaller in magnitude as this hypothetical, earlier implementation of the 2008 car tax reform would have implied a smaller reduction of the average tax rate. Excluding total firm profits from the net welfare calculation would however imply a net welfare change close to zero for this time period.
Isolating the Effects of Tax-Rate Differentiation
Differentiation of a fixed-rate tax by CO 2 emissions without affecting the average tax rate has a noticeable negative effect on average CO 2 emissions of new cars but only a very small effect on the total number of cars sold. The differentiated car tax reduces the total number of new cars sold between 2008 and 2010 by 4,604 cars or 1.4 percent compared to a fixed tax rate equivalent to the yearly sales-weighted tax rate of the CO 2 differentiated car tax. CO 2 emissions rates under the differentiated tax are 4.0 g/km or 2.5 percent lower than they would have been under such hypothetical fixed-rate tax. The strong increase in total vehicle sales of the 2008 car tax reform is thus explained by the average rate reduction, not the differentiation of tax rates. Furthermore, the effect of the 2008 car tax reform on CO 2 emissions rates is small because the negative effect of the rate differentiation is mitigated by the average rate reduction. Reducing the average tax rate leads to higher CO 2 emissions rates as expensive, high-emissions cars become affordable to more consumers. 23 The differentiated car tax also implies higher net welfare compared to the hypothetical equivalent fixed-rate tax. Table 16 reports aggregate welfare effects, and shows that both government tax revenue and firm profits would have been slightly higher between 2008 and 2010, had the car tax been lowered but not differentiated. The tax-rate differentiation has however a large positive effect on aggregate consumer welfare despite relatively slightly lower sales. Buyers of low-emissions car models benefit strongly from a CO 2 differentiation of tax rates, and table 17 decomposes the aggregate consumer welfare change. The decomposition shows that high-income households benefited disproportionally from the CO 2 differentiation of tax rates. The magnitudes of the aggregate welfare effects of the 2008 car tax reform reported in table 14 are nonetheless largely driven by the reduction of the average tax rate. If tax rates had been lowered but not differentiated, the net welfare gain would have been only about more than one fourth smaller.
Concluding Remarks
This study evaluates the equilibrium effects of an environmentally motivated tax reform on the market for new cars. The focus on a small European market allows me to isolate the market response to fiscal policy targeting consumers from concurrent policies, including the introduction of mandatory supply-side CO 2 standards. One key result is that domestic fiscal policy did not drive the decline of CO 2 emissions rates of new cars in Finland between 2008 and 2010 despite the strong decline of this key statistic to policymakers. Consumers predominantly bought cleaner cars due to technological change. The trend towards cleaner cars being marketed in Finland is exogenous to this small market and likely driven by the supply-side policy. Environmental fiscal policy in other, important European markets might also have provided manufacturers with an incentive to produce cleaner cars. However, my results show that even the drastic Finnish ad valorem tax rate differentiation only had a limited effect on consumer choices on the intensive margin. A second important result of this study is that environmental fiscal policy can have large distributional implications. High-income consumers benefited disproportionally from the CO 2 differentiation of Finnish car tax rates while government tax revenue declined strongly. A reduction of the average tax rate implied by the differentiation is largely responsible for the magnitude of these distributional effects. The differentiation of vehiclespecific tax rates by CO 2 emissions rating would have nonetheless also been regressive, had the the average tax rate not been lowered.
This study has two important policy implications. First, optimal fiscal policy needs to be based on a thorough understanding of consumer demand and market structure. Firms adjust price-cost markups in response to fiscal policy, and directly affect both tax-inclusive consumer prices and government tax revenue of an ad valorem tax. Policymakers anticipated stable tax revenue after the differentiation of car tax rates. However, tax revenue however declined as higher sales were insufficient to keep revenue stable. Structural econometric models and counterfactual simulations can help to infer the likely effects of policies before implementation by increasing our understanding of markets, even if out-of-sample forecasting remains challenging.
As a second important policy implication, optimal fiscal policy needs to consider interdependent environmental policies also on different levels of government. Among others, Goulder et al. (2012) highlight the unintended consequences of policy coordination failure. In this study, mandatory EU (federal) CO 2 standards to manufacturers necessarily lead to lower tax rates under a domestic (state) ad valorem tax differentiated by CO 2 emissions.. Policymakers introduced such differentiated tax despite the upcoming introduction of supply-side standards. The resulting decline of CO 2 emissions rates of cars available to consumers in Finland thus led to a reduction of the average total tax rate from around 62 percent in 2008 to around 58.5 percent in 2010. Policymakers unsurprisingly increased tax rates in 2012 after a continuous decline of tax revenue.
I conclude this study with cautionary remarks. Most importantly, results of this study are obtained under some strong assumptions. Reynaert (2015) concludes with similar remarks but is able to test the performance of his structural model to explain observed market outcomes. The small size of my data, one market observed for only seven years, prevents me from similar robustness checks. I am limited to notice that I closely follow the established literature on demand and supply estimation in automobile markets. Furthermore, I use a reduced-form approach in Stitzing (2016a) to quantify the effect of the 2008 car tax reform on CO 2 emissions rates of new cars. The reduced-form study is limited to the estimation of the reform's effect on this key statistic to policymakers but less driven by functional and distributional assumptions. Furthermore, it does not assume static preferences, and also uses a less aggregate consumer choice set. The estimated effect is only slightly larger than but comparable to the effect estimated with the structural model in this study. The reduced-form analysis thus adds confidence to the structural approach in this study yet limitations remain. These are also related to the focus on the market for new cars. Fiscal policy affecting the new-car market also potentially affects the used-car market. I implicitly assume that such policy does not affect the value of the outside option includes the possibility to purchase a used car. Sales taxation of passenger cars can also affect the driving behavior of consumers. D'Haultfoeuille et al. (2014) find evidence for such rebound effect by French consumers following the introduction of a CO 2 feebate. Future research on these issues appears fruitful. Income tier probability conditional on purchase in percent Income tier a Observed (Std Err) bc Model prediction Low (< 25, 303) 13.751 (0.046) 13.748 Middle (25, 303 − 42, 899) 31.957 (0.062) 31.973 High (> 42, 899) 54.292 (0.066) 54.280 a Income tiers divide households into equally sized groups based on net household income. b Observed probability is based on 568,170 observations in FLEED 2004 568,170 observations in FLEED -2010 c Sampling variance associated with moments (accounted for in estimation procedure). . The non-differentiated (CO 2 -differentiated) car tax is the observed car tax in 2004-2007 (2004-2008) , and the counterfactual tax in 2008-2010 (2004-2007) . 
Notes:
The table shows equilibrium effects of the CO 2 -differentiated car tax using the equilibrium under the non-differentiated car tax as baseline. The non-differentiated (CO 2 -differentiated) car tax is the observed car tax in 2004-2007 (2004-2008) , and the counterfactual tax in Notes: The table shows equilibrium effects of the CO 2 -differentiated car tax using the equilibrium under the non-differentiated car tax as baseline. The non-differentiated (CO 2 -differentiated) car tax is the observed car tax in 2004-2007 (2004-2008) , and the counterfactual tax in 2008-2010 (2004-2007) . 
The table shows equilibrium effects of the CO 2 -differentiated car tax using the equilibrium under the non-differentiated car tax as baseline. The non-differentiated (CO 2 -differentiated) car tax is the observed car tax in 2004-2007 (2004-2008) , and the counterfactual tax in 2008-2010 (2004-2007) . 
The table shows equilibrium effects of the CO 2 -differentiated car tax using a counterfactual fixed-rate tax equivalent to the sales-weighted tax rate as baseline. 
The table shows equilibrium effects of the CO 2 -differentiated car tax using a counterfactual fixed-rate tax equivalent to the sales-weighted tax rate as baseline. Petrol, CO2-differentiated tax Petrol, non-differentiated tax Diesel, CO2-differentiated tax Diesel, non-differentiated tax
where N is the number of micro-level observations.
Stack the BLP and micro-moments
where W is a weight matrix. I use Matlab's fminsearch Nelder-Mead algorithm for the estimation with a tight tolerance of 10e −6 . Following the documentation of numerical issues of the estimator by Knittel and Metaxoglou (2014) , I use multiple starting values as well as the subgradient-based noisy function optimizer SolvOpt to confirm obtained minimum is indeed a global one.
Optimal Weight Matrix
The BLP and micro-moments are based on different sampling processes so that the weight matrix is block diagonal, W = W bl p 0 0 W micro .
I use a two-step GMM procedure with an identity matrix in the first step. Following Furlong (2012), the optimal weighting matrix of the micro-moments, W micro , needs account for the variancecovariance of the micro-moment prediction errors, the uncertainty with the conditional means constructed from the micro data, and the differences in sample size between the market and micro data. The optimal weighting matrix for the micro-moments iŝ
whereθ 2 are the parameter estimates of the first step, c = (J/N) −1 scales the micro-moment weight matrix, ∆ g (θ 2 ) is the variance-covariance of the micro-moment prediction errors of the first step, and ∆ h is the uncertainty of the conditional means of the micro data, Furlong (2012) discusses the micro-moment methodology in detail but forgets to invert the scale factor c in his otherwise very helpful discussion. Myojo and Kanazawa (2012) use the correct scale factor when discussing the asymptotic properties of the estimator in great detail.
